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Argument
I.

The offense of driving with any measurable
controlled substance in the body is not
necessarily included in the offense of driving
under the influence, despite the State's claim.

In this issue of first impression, Wallace agrees with the State that the pivotal
question is whether the second element of the driving with any measurable controlled
substance in the body statute (DWM) is necessarily included within the second element
of the driving under the influence statute (DUI). Br. Appellee 17. The two elements
are:
1

[A person may not operate ... a vehicle ... if the person has]
"any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a
controlled substance in the ... body,"
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.6 (1997), and
[A person may not operate ... a vehicle ...] 'Under
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that
renders the person incapable of safely operating a
vehicle,"
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) (1997).
The State argues first that once a person takes drugs and the drugs become
measurable in the body, as described in section 41-6-44.6. then that person is under the
influence of drugs within the meaning of section 41-6-44. "Thus a driver who has a
controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance in his body (the second
element of a DWM), is necessarily under the influence of that drug (the second element
of a DUI)." Br. Appellee 18. This argument, however, makes no sense medically or
legally. The phrase "under the influence" cannot be read in isolation, apart from what
follows.1 Having a detectable drug in the body is not one and the same thing as being
under the influence of the drug, where "under the influence" is expressly defined as the
incapacity to safely operate a vehicle. Indeed, some drugs, including controlled
substances and their metabolites, produce no perceptible change in human functioning or

*The State incorrectly claims that there are three elements in the DUI statute.
Element two is "is under the influence of... any drug," and element three is "[T]o the
degree that renders [him] incapable of safely operating a vehicle." See Br. Appellee 16.
2

have very limited effects such as temporary pain relief. They do not render a person
impaired and unable to drive safely. The shot of novocaine that we receive in the
dentist's office is one example. That drug does not prevent us from driving home
unassisted and in a normal manner after our dental work is completed. Our driving is not
impaired either by the painkiller that we may take for a day or two after visiting the
dentist. Many believe, similarly, that moderate consumption of alcohol does not render
an individual incapable of driving safely. That is why, in section 41-6-44, driving under
the influence is not defined as having a blood or breath alcohol concentration of any
amount whatsoever but rather .08 grams or greater.
The DUI statute is not concerned with whether a person is "under the influence"
in some broad definitional sense, as the State proposes, simply because the person has
taken a drug or consumed alcohol. Rather, the statute is meant to deal with the societal
problem of people driving when they are impaired due to drugs or alcohol. The DWM
statute, on the other hand, does not make such a distinction. A person may be driving
completely safely. Nonetheless, if he or she has any measurable amount of a controlled
substance in the body, and the controlled substance was taken illicitly, a violation of
section 41-6-44.6 occurs. For this reason, the elements of the DUI and DWM statutes
are different. In one, drug use rises to the level of a criminal offense only if a person is
rendered incapable of safely operating a vehicle. In the other, illicit drug use prior to
driving is an offense per se. Because the statutory elements are not identical, driving

3

with any measurable controlled substance in the body cannot be a necessarily included
offense of driving under the influence.
Secondly, the State argues that language in section 41-6-44.6, specifically "[i]n
cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44," signifies that DWM is a lesser
included offense of DUI. Br. Appellee 18-19. This is, however, a novel reading of the
language in the statute. The State presents no authority or other support for its
interpretation. A better reading, and one actually supported by case law in this
jurisdiction, is that DWM and DUI are totally separate offenses that the State could have
charged Wallace with in the alternative.
In State v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 441 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), defendant appealed the
fact that he was charged in the same information with aggravated sexual assault and
incest, involving his adult daughter. He claimed that the charges were mutually
exclusive. This Court, however, held that the crimes of aggravated sexual assault and
incest are not repugnant and can be charged alternatively. Id. at 446. The Court
considered language that had been added to the incest statute, namely "under
circumstances not amounting to rape, rape of a child or aggravated sexual assault." "The
primary purpose of the ... language," the Court said, "was likely to encourage criminal
punishment under those greater crimes when the evidence in a particular case warrants
it." Id. at 445. In other words, as a prosecutorial principle, defendants ideally should be
convicted of the greatest crime that the evidence in a case warrants. Charging defendants
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in the alternative sometimes furthers this particular goal of the state.
Had Wallace been charged with DUI and DWM in the alternative, the issue that
he now presents on appeal would not have arisen. Wallace understands and does not
dispute that the State could have charged him alternatively. But the State did not choose
to do so. Instead, it sought a lesser included instruction from the trial court in the middle
of trial, at a point, in fact, where defense counsel rightly voiced concerns about due
process. T. 305. Undoubtedly prompting the State's action was a realization that the
evidence presented at trial did not support Wallace's conviction on the charge of driving
under the influence.
Significantly, charging in the alternative and seeking a lesser included instruction
involve different operations of the law and different legal strategies. Charging in the
alternative, as Montoya indicates, is done for evidentiary reasons. The evidence adduced
at trial determines which of two or even more charges a defendant is actually convicted
of. The elements of the charges vary and may or may not overlap. On the other hand,
seeking a lesser included instruction occurs precisely because there is overlap between
the elements of certain offenses. In fact, all the elements of the lesser offense are
contained within the elements of the greater offense charged. That is the definition of a
lesser included offense.
What has made this case difficult is that, on the surface, DWM appears as if it
could be a lesser included offense of DUI. The first statutory element in both offenses is

5

virtually identical. The second element seems very similar. But it is not identical. As
discussed above, the DWM statute makes it a violation of lawyer se to drive after illicit
drug use whereas under the DUI statute there is no violation absent the incapacity to
drive safely. DWM therefore is not a lesser included offense of DUI.
The State argues finally that DWM and DUI occupy the same relationship, as
lesser and greater offenses, that theft and robbery do. Just as a theft, with additional
facts, may become a robbery, so may a DWM escalate into a DUI. Br. Appellee 20. This
argument fails, however, because element two of the DWM statute and element two of
the DUI statute are not identical. In addition, the DWM statute injects something not
found at all in the DUI statute, namely the phrase "metabolite." As the State correctly
notes, a "metabolite" is a chemical by-product caused by the natural breakdown of a
controlled substance in the body. Br. Appellee 18 fn.7. Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a controlled substance is a "drug," within the meaning of the DUI statute,
there is nevertheless nothing to indicate that a "metabolite" is included definitionally.
Section 41-6-44 refers merely to "alcohol" or "any drug." Had the legislature wished to
include "metabolite" in the statute, it would have done so expressly, as in section 41-644.6.2 Because DUI does not encompass having a metabolite in the body, DWM once

2

Arguably, the reason that the legislature did not include "metabolite" in the DUI
statute is that if a person has a measurable amount of a metabolite in the body, without
any measurable amount of the original controlled substance, he or she probably is not
under the influence of the controlled substance to the point of impairment.
6

again cannot be a lesser included offense.
In sum, driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body is not a
lesser included charge of driving under the influence. The jury instruction that the State
asked for and received should not have been allowed. Trial counsel rendered
constitutionally deficient performance in not objecting to the instruction. In the
alternative, the trial court committed plain error in granting the State's request.3
II.

There was no need for police to take a blood
sample from Wallace without his consent.
Further, it was taken without a valid search
warrant, despite the State's arguments to
the contrary.

The error that occurred when the jury received the lesser included instruction
regarding driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body provides a
sufficient basis, in itself, to reverse Wallace's convictions and grant him a new trial. Still,
another basis for reversal and granting of a new trial is found in the circumstances
surrounding the sampling of Wallace's blood by police, in particular the validity of the
search warrant that police used.
But even assuming, for the moment, that the search warrant was valid, it is clear
under Utah law that a motorist may refuse a chemical test, including a blood test, when

3

The State, in its brief, fails completely to address the second part of the
Strickland ineffective assistance test, as well as the second and third parts of the Dunn
plain error test, by arguing only that no error occurred when the trial court granted the
lesser included jury instruction. See Br. Appellee 20-21 and fn.8.
7

arrested for suspected DWM or DUI. Police may request a test; the motorist however
does not necessarily have to submit to it. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44.10 (1997) and 533-223 (1994); State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1968) ("an arrested person is
compelled to elect whether he will submit to a chemical test"). There is, needless to say,
a penalty for the motorist. Refusal to submit to testing may result in revocation of the
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. Id.
Given this statutory framework, Wallace's blood testing lay outside the scope of
search warrants in the first place.4 Wallace of course does not claim that police never
may obtain search warrants and proceed with chemical tests in certain types of criminal
cases, including motor vehicle cases. Chemical testing seems appropriate in motor
vehicle cases where there has been a felony violation or death or serious injury. He
believes, however, that Utah law gives him the right, when merely suspected of being
under the influence, of refusing testing and then suffering the consequence of possibly
losing his driver's licensed If this is so, then police never possessed the right to obtain a
sample of his blood, even with a warrant, and the evidence should not have come in
against him at trial. Whether the warrant was valid or not is immaterial.
4

The State nowhere addresses this argument, which Wallace raised for the first
time in his original brief. See Br. Appellant 17 fh.2.
5

"[T]he purpose of such a law is to avoid the violence which often attends
attempts to forcibly test recalcitrant drivers." In the Interest of R.L.I, 739 P.2d 1123,
1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Wallace's case, the penalty that most likely would have
been imposed was revocation, for an additional period of time, of his already suspended
driver's license. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)(h) (1997).
8

The State in any event argues that the warrant was valid, because, first, it was
"precise and unambiguous.'* Br. Appellee 22. The typewritten, stock search warrant, in
and of itself, may have been so. But it was accompanied by a typewritten, stock affidavit
in support and a handwritten affidavit that were anything but precise and unambiguous.
The stock affidavit requested a blood sample. This, however, was contradicted by
amendment of paragraph 5, which then acknowledged that one of the reasons for blood
sampling, refusal to submit to intoxilyzer testing, did not apply in Wallace's case.
Request for a blood sample also was contradicted by the total strikeout of paragraph 6,
stating that sampling is necessary because evidence of impairment dissipates rapidly in
the bloodstream. The handwritten affidavit requested a urine sample. There was no
request whatsoever for testing of blood. A common-sense reading of the warrant and two
affidavits, in their entirety, does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that police wanted
to sample Wallace's blood.
Secondly, the State argues that Officer Davis' amendment of the stock affidavit
evidences the intent to seek a blood draw as opposed to a urine sample. "Had ... Davis
sought a urine sample, it is reasonable to conclude that he would have altered the stock
forms to reference a urine sample." Br. Appellee 24. This particular argument, however,
cuts both ways. If Officer Davis truly had wanted blood testing, he would not have
crossed out paragraph 6. Also, he would not have gone to the effort of supplementing
the stock affidavit with his handwritten affidavit, in which he expressly requested a urine
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sample and nothing else. In this same light, were the handwritten affidavit prepared
solely for the purpose of establishing probable cause, as the State suggests, Br. Appellee
23, Davis had no need to specify any manner of chemical testing at all. His affidavit
should have been silent about testing.
Finally, the State challenges Wallace's reading of State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d
1099 (Utah 1995). Br. Appellee 24-26. In fact, the State and Wallace interpret
Anderson in the same manner, though perhaps with a slight difference in the shading of
words. The case stands for the proposition that search warrants should be interpreted
contextually, in light of supporting affidavits. What that means here is that the
typewritten, stock search warrant, which the State wishes this Court to believe is "precise
and unambiguous," is actually uncertain or at least equivocal in nature. When
considered alongside the two affidavits, the warrant fails utterly to make clear that police
wished to obtain a blood sample.
Bottom line, the search warrant that police used to sample Wallace's blood was
not valid. It was facially deficient. It failed to describe with particularity the evidence to
be seized. In the alternative, it authorized sampling of urine, not blood. This argument
assumes that police had the right to obtain a blood sample from Wallace despite the fact
that he elected not to submit to chemical testing and he never gave consent as section 416-44.10 allows. Wallace received ineffective assistance because defense counsel did not

10

vigorously pursue these matters.6
HI

Police acted wholly outside the scope of their
authority when they forced Wallace to submit
to blood sampling. For that reason, Wallace
was justified in resisting and assaulting Officer
Ruble.

At issue is the scope of Wallace's right, if indeed he possessed the right, to
forcibly resist police when they overpowered him and made him submit to blood testing
on the jail cell floor. Wallace and the State both agree that the key case is State v.
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991). Wallace also agrees with the State that Gardiner
is correct in interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1987) to mean that "[t]he only
language in this section that could be construed as giving any sanction to a right to resist
...is the phrase 'and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as
a peace officer.'" Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574. A citizen is justified in resisting only if an
officer is acting '"wholly outside the scope of his authority." Id.
Wallace, however, disputes the State's claim that in assessing whether an officer is
acting outside the scope of his or her authority, "the test" is whether the officer is doing
what he or she is employed to do or is "engaging in a personal frolic of his [or her] own."
Br. Appellee 27 (quoting United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2nd Cir. 1967).

6

The State has not responded to Wallace's ineffective assistance claim in its
entirety, because it believes that blood sampling occurred pursuant to a valid warrant,
any attempt to suppress the toxicology reports would have been futile, and therefore
Wallace has not satisfied even the first part of the Strickland test.
11

Gardiner, at 575, quoted this passage from Heliczer. But the supreme court merely
termed the passage "illustrative" with regard to interpreting the phase "scope of
authority." The court did not formally adopt "engaging in a personal frolic" as the test to
be applied in this jurisdiction. No bright line rule was announced, and the matter is not
at all clear. Perhaps, if anything, the court gave some indication of adopting a totality of
circumstances test for use in deciding whether police officers are acting within the scope
of their authority. The unique facts and circumstances of the interaction between police
and defendant were discussed in some detail in Gardiner. Id. at 575-76.
In addition, in its briefing, the State has made it appear that Gardiner held or
asserted by way of dicta that an officer executing a search warrant is by definition not
"engaging in a personal frolic." See Br. Appellee 28,11. 9-11. Gardiner explicitly made
no such announcement, either on the page cited or anywhere else in the opinion.
The application of Gardiner to this case is further complicated by important
differences in the fact scenarios. As the supreme court observed in Gardiner, when this
Court first considered the case, prior to grant of certiorari, it framed the salient issue as
"whether a citizen has the right to forcibly resist a peaceful search ...." Id. at 570
(emphasis added). Police in Gardiner were in fact simply seeking peaceful admission
into a loud party. Id. at 569. In this case, there was nothing peaceful about the actions
of police. Wallace was told that he needed to submit to a blood draw (which,
incidentally, is contrary to section 41-6-44.10(2)(a), requiring warning that refusal may
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result in license revocation). Further, he was told, W4we can do it the easy way or the hard
way." T. 266. Police threatened Wallace with violence, and a violent interaction is
exactly what occurred between them. Also, while Gardiner involved search of a
building, the intrusion here was into the human body. The State attempts to minimize
this particular difference by citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass 'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and arguing that these
cases sanction testing of Wallace's blood. Br. Appellee 28-29. The exact opposite is
true. The cases do not support the State. As Wallace pointed out in his original brief,
defendant in Schmerber was involved in an automobile accident with injuries to his
passenger and therefore, under California law, he was subject to felony prosecution. Br.
Appellant 21-22 fn.3. Skinner concerned itself with chemical testing of railroad workers
following on-the-job accidents. Testing properly took place in these circumstances,
which do not, however, exist in this case.7
Given a proper reading of Gardiner, as well as the important factual differences
here, Wallace believes that it cannot be said that police were acting within the scope of
their authority when they forcibly drew his blood against his will. Two reasons
predominate. First, the warrant that police used was facially deficient. Secondly, and
perhaps more significantly, police had no legal right to sample Wallace's blood without

7

Also, of course, the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber and Skinner was
not called upon to interpret section 41-6-44.10, in particular the right given to motorists
to refuse chemical testing coupled with the possibility of license revocation.
13

consent in the first place, given section 41-6-44.10. Regarding this second reason,
Wallace hesitates to use the phrase "frolic." Nonetheless, if the word is understood
broadly, something resembling a frolic occurred in the jail cell. Police acted totally
outside the law. They engaged in a kind of schoolyard game with Wallace, to see if he
would blink first. "The easy way or the hard way," they said. No thought was given
about terminating this exchange, so that violence could have been avoided and the law
might take its natural course, with Wallace most likely losing his driver's license for an
additional period of time. The facts are extremely egregious in this case, much more so
than in Gardiner, decided by a 3-2 vote of the supreme court.
Assuming that police acted wholly outside of the scope of their authority, Wallace
was justified in resisting the blood draw and in the process assaulting Officer Ruble.
Wallace received ineffective assistance when defense counsel failed to press this claim
and also move to dismiss the assault charge for insufficiency of evidence.8
IV.

Prior to trial, the State was required to give
notice of its expert witnesses pursuant to
Utah R. Crim. P. 16 and Utah R. Civ. P. 16
even if section 77-17-13 did not apply.
Wallace was harmed by the State's failure
to give notice.

From the outset, Wallace has acknowledged that the expert witness notice

8

The State does not deal with the ineffective assistance claim in its entirety, or the
insufficiency of evidence argument, on grounds that police were acting within the scope
of their authority when they drew Wallace's blood and therefore Wallace was not
justified in resisting as he did. See, e.g., Br. Appellee 28 fn.13.
14

requirement found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1994) may not apply in the facts of
this case. Br. Appellant 27-28. How to interpret the statute is uncertain. The State may
be correct in its interpretation, that is, that defense counsel was not entitled to notice
because Wallace never was charged with any felony drug offense and the statute is not
applicable to hybrid cases, with both misdemeanor and felony offenses, such as this one.
Br. Appellee 31-21.
Wallace, however, argues alternatively that Utah R. Crim. P. 16 and Utah R. Civ.
P. 16 required proper notification about the State's experts, even if section 77-17-13 did
not. See State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Br.
Appellant 28. The State makes no attempt to rebut this argument in its brief.
Assuming that notice was required, the issue becomes whether Wallace was
harmed by defense counsel's decision not to request continuance of the trial. As
Wallace and the State both note, the trial court indicated that it was prepared to continue
trial were it asked to do so. T. 302-03.
The State argues that Wallace bears the burden of demonstrating harm, under the
second part of the Stricklandtest. Br. Appellee 34. Wallace continues to believe,
however, that State v. Arellano, supra, liberalized Strickland and shifted to the State the
burden of proving the absence of prejudice when defendants do not receive adequate
notification of expert witness testimony before trial. As this Court has stated, "In
Arellano, we recognized the difficult burden placed on defendants to establish prejudice
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in cases such as these, and we shifted the burden of proving prejudice from the defendant
to the State." State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, \ 14, 19 P.3d 400. Further, the key
question in Arellano and Tolano, as it is in this case, was whether defendants were
harmed by continuation of trial when the State failed to provide proper notice regarding
its experts. The fact that defendants' attorneys in Arellano and Tolano sought
continuance, which the trial court denied, and defense counsel here never sought
continuance, is irrelevant to the issue of harm. Likewise, it is irrelevant whether harm
may have occurred through trial court error or ineffective assistance; the issue again is
one of harm. The State asserts, unconvincingly, that such factual differences are
important in resolving the point of law that Wallace raises. See Br. Appellee 35-36.
In this case, the State has completely failed to show how Wallace was not harmed
by continuation of trial. The State claims that "counsel's efforts to discredit the
toxiciologists' testimony was [sic] apparently successful in part" because Wallace was
acquitted of DUI even though he was convicted of DWM. Br. Appellee 37. But a fair
reading of the trial transcript indicates that Wallace was acquitted of DUI not because of
defense counsel's cross-examination of the toxicologists but rather the State's inability to
prove that Wallace was under the influence of drugs to the point of impairment when he
was actually behind the wheel driving. Also, defense counsel's cross-examination of the
toxicologists was predictable and perfunctory, based on past experience with the
witnesses as opposed to all written materials pertaining to the case at hand, which

16

counsel did not have the opportunity to review beforehand because the State did not
produce them.
In such circumstances, particularly where the State has not met its burden of
proof, this Court should accept Wallace's explanation of harm. As this Court declared in
Tolano, "In the present case, the State has not met its burden, and ; we are left to
speculate as to what defendant could and would have done. Therefore, if any party
should suffer from the uncertainty, it should be the party at fault. As such, we give
defendant's explanation of prejudice ... the benefit of the doubt.'" Id. at ^J15 (quoting
Arellano, 964

V2dci\Ul\\

Defense counsel rendered deficient performance, and Wallace was harmed as
well, when counsel neglected to move the trial court to continue trial because of the
State's failure to give adequate notice regarding its expert witnesses.
V.

The trial court should have continued trial
because the relationship between Wallace
and court-appointed counsel was irretrievably
broken. The Begishe test is inapposite. Even
so, continuation of trial would have been
warranted in light of Begishe.

In his original brief, Wallace asserts that the trial court should have continued trial
prior to jury selection and allowed him to obtain a new attorney because the relationship
that he had with court-appointed counsel was irretrievably broken. Br. Appellant 35.
The State, however, does not respond to this particular claim. Rather, it argues that the
trial court was justified in not continuing trial given the four-part test enunciated in State
17

v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Br. Appellee 38-39, 42-44.
Significantly, none of the Begishe factors involves the nature of the attorney-client
relationship, in particular whether it satisfied Wallace's constitutional right to assistance
of counsel.
Trial in this case should have been continued, regardless of Begishe. Wallace's
relationship with counsel was irretrievably broken. In chambers, prior to trial, Wallace
complained angrily that he was not receiving vigorous representation because counsel did
not share his view that certain rights of his had been violated by the State. T. 5-6.
Wallace and counsel had not been able to form a working relationship. Further, Wallace
apparently was so upset with counsel that he felt that he could not talk meaningfully
with him. There was little or no communication. Counsel himself essentially admitted
that the relationship had broken down early on when he said, "... I think it's just
been-just been no real communication since I started representing him." T. 6-7. That
Wallace left the courthouse after the in-chambers meeting, rather than allow himself to
be represented by court-appointed counsel, is perhaps the best evidence of the failed
attorney-client relationship that then existed.
In such circumstances, the trial court properly should have continued trial so that
Wallace might obtain different counsel. This very much was a case where "the
defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point
that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth
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Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for substitution." State v. Pursifell,
746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); accord State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, If 27, 984
P.2d 382 (citing Pursifell).
Importantly, when trial courts assess the attorney-client relationship for purposes
of possibly appointing or otherwise allowing substitute counsel, emphasis should be
placed on the nature of that relationship at the moment of inquiry as opposed to who did
what over time and thus may be responsible for its possible breakdown. This is not to
say that such matters never may be relevant to the question of substituting counsel. On
the other hand, they are usually only minor or secondary considerations. The
relationship between attorney and client is, in some w7ays, like a marriage. When
attorneys and clients "divorce," metaphorically, and when men and women divorce,
literally, the legal ground to be considered is one and the same, though it may be called
"irretrievable breakdown" or "irreconcilable differences." That is, the question is: Is this
relationship still viable or not? If not, the parties should be allowed to separate. And
separation should take place regardless of who was "at fault."
In this case, the trial court and the State on appeal have spent an inordinate and
inappropriate amount of time attempting to place blame on Wallace for the breakdown of
the attorney-client relationship. That relationship, like a marriage, was the responsibility
of both court-appointed counsel and Wallace. Arguably, if as counsel claimed Wallace
was ignoring his attempts at communication, he should have notified the court of the fact
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promptly and sought inquiry and appropriate action pursuant to PursifelL Wallace
should have appeared or if necessary been made to appear at a hearing. Wallace should
have been appointed substitute counsel or, no later than a date certain, he should have
been required to retain private counsel and give notice to the court. The matter should
not have simmered then boiled over in the way that it did on the very morning of
scheduled trial.
Thus, the Begishe test is inapposite to the issue at hand. Nonetheless, even if the
test is applicable, continuation of trial would have been justified in light of the four
factors set forth.
The first factor to be analyzed in Begishe is whether Wallace was diligent in his
efforts to ready his defense prior to the date set for trial. Here, Wallace makes no false
claims. In hindsight, he could have assisted defense counsel more diligently. Wallace
adds, however, that he was only one party in a two party relationship. Had defense
counsel notified the trial court about the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship,
and had the court allowed Wallace to obtain new counsel, the same problems would not
have existed in all probability and Wallace would have been fully prepared for trial.
The remaining three factors all support Wallace. It is likely that a continuance
would have met the need for continuance. The State speculates, Br. Appellee 42, that
Wallace did not have funds immediately available to retain private counsel. But this is
pure speculation. Wallace was employed and earning money. T. 5-6. Presumably, he
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could have made appropriate financial arrangements with an attorney. Even if, by a date
certain, Wallace had not hired an attorney privately, the court was vested with authority
to appoint him another legal defender. Next, any inconvenience to the trial court would
have been minor. Indeed, the court indicated in the middle of trial that, if asked, it
would grant a continuance so that the State could give adequate notice regarding its
expert witnesses. The court's overriding concern, which to its credit it recognized, was
Wallace's right to a fair trial. Finally, Wallace faced harm in the event that the trial were
not continued. As counsel candidly admitted, "If [Wallace] were to get some attorney
that he could cooperate with, he would probably be, maybe, better prepared than I am."
T. 9. The State argues that Wallace actually was not harmed. Br. Appellee 43-44. In
response, Wallace once again avers that he was and that the numerous issues presented
on appeal demonstrate this fact conclusively. Wallace was correct when he said that
counsel was not willing or prepared to defend his rights, some of which, it is clear, have
constitutional significance.
Conclusion
All of Wallace's jury convictions should be reversed and Wallace should be
granted a new trial because of one or more instances of ineffective assistance of counsel,
in addition to cumulative error. In the alternative, reversal and a new trial should occur
because the trial court did not conduct specific inquiry and then continue trial following
Wallace's expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel.
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At minimum, Wallace's conviction for driving with any measurable controlled
substance in the body should be reversed because the trial court committed plain error in
granting the State's request for a lesser included instruction on that charge. His
conviction for assault against a police officer should be reversed because of insufficiency
of evidence, in particular the inability of the State to demonstrate that Officer Ruble was
acting within the scope of his authority when police drew Wallace's blood.
DATED this

day of January, 2002.

WESLEY M. BADEN
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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